| As failures go, attempting to account
for the the spell under which an author lives while involved with
a book is like trying to revive a powerful attraction. It is not
difficult to give the external reasons for the endeavor —
this thrilling structure, that clandestine thought — but
the fascination is long gone, and with it, one’s ability
to impart the bewildering sensation of not being even prudently
in control of one’s ardor. It may still be champagne, oh
sure, but the spunk and sparkle have vanished.
Permit me, therefore, to begin
flatly, with a quotation. It will be the only academic one I shall
provide, but as such, it may better convey the peculiar notion
by which I was once captivated than any belated account of late-night
activities and early-morning embarrassments. It concerns the relation
between theory and practice, that hobby horse of yore, and no
doubt you will consider it a peculiar phenomenon on which to cling.
Yet it is true, such was my infatuation, and I need serious philosophical
help to prevent you from smiling at the ride on which my enchantment
once took me.
“With this distinction
between the empirical and the essential,” Jacques Derrida
remarks in his study of Paul Celan’s poetry:
| |
a limit is blurred, that of the philosophical
as such, philosophical distinction itself. Philosophy finds
itself, rediscovers itself, in the vicinity of the poetic,
indeed of literature. It finds itself there, for the indecision
of this limit is perhaps what most provokes it to thought.
It finds itself there, it does not necessarily lose itself
there as those believe, in their tranquil credulity, who believe
that they know where this limit is situated and timorously
keep within it, ingeniously, although without innocence, stripped
of what one must call the philosophical experience: a certain
questioning crossing of limits, unsureness as to the border
of the philosophical field — and above all the experience
of language, an experience always as poetic, or literary,
as it is philosophical. 1 |
I imagine that the account of this experience — as literary
as it is philosophical, at least if we follow Derrida, and always
made under the aegis of a peculiar indecision — is what
we commonly refer to as an “essay.” At any rate, that
is the formal designation by which I ended up labeling my enchantment.
More searching than systematic, more interrogating than assertive,
more descriptive and performing than illustrative and explanating,
the essay tends to constitute an anti-genre.2
As such, it vouches for a poetics of longing, to redeploy Lukács’s
handsome phrase, where the border between thought and experience,
word and act, is challenged, and fact and fiction have learned
to live in each other’s vicinity.
If the essayist sails under a particular flag, it can only be
the gray one of indeterminacy. At the very least, the mast with
the aid of which he sets sail must be the pencil, displaying itself
as a fragile and finite straw against an otherwise bleak horizon.
In the cranky vessel of an essay, familiar with the tricky tides
of existence and sudden fluxes of time, the author travels across
surfaces harboring just as many cunning depths as dangerous shallows.
In the final analysis, his or her only compass is the inner one
of idiosyncrasy.
To this peculiar compound of thought and experience — let
me to refer to it as “essayism” — belongs the
ability to persevere in the absence of definite answers and dependable
weather. It is hardly surprising, then, that an intended perspectivism
is usually suggested as method — or better: attitude —
for the essayist. “It was,” Robert Musil remarks,
| |
approximately in the way that an
essay . . . takes a thing from many sides without comprehending
it wholly . . . that he believed he could best survey and
handle the world and his life.3 |
Despite its avowed plurality of perspectives, despite its precise
openness, and despite its exact sort of vagueness, an essay cannot
be reduced to a gathering of lose threads or slack-handed attempt
to draw the contours of life in writing — that is, the particular
form of intelligibility that a certain sequence of observations,
a certain row of reflections may constitute once these have become
alphabetical. “The translation of the word ‘essay’
as ‘attempt,’” continues Musil,
| |
only approximately gives the most
important allusion to the literary model. For an essay is
not the provisional or incidental expression of a conviction
that might on a more favorable occasion be elevated to the
status of truth . . . an essay is the unique and unalterable
form that a person’s inner life assumes in a decisive
thought.4 |
In the following, I would like to investigate what such “decisive
thought” might imply. Evidently, it marks a critical moment
with consequences also for how to conducts one’s life. The
“unique and unalterable form” invoked by Musil seems
to contain a moral. To make my point, I shall take recourse to
The Gray Book,5 but before I commit
the blunder of speaking roughly in my own name, I would like to
bring the essay, considered as an anti-genre, in connection with
an aesthetic category with which it seems to have little in common,
but which it, on closer inspection, hardly can do without: the
work. What interests me in particular is the relationship between
the essay’s claim to openness and the supposed closure of
the work (be it one of literature or of art) — or put differently:
the curious relation between process and progeny. For it is somewhere
here, I suspect, in the gray zone between becoming and being,
that the essay is most at home.
As the natural medium of inquiry, the essay has a distinctive
preference for what has been discarded, left, and abandoned, or
at the very least been neglected by intelligibility’s virtuous
bore, systematic thought. Yet if the shreddings of pencils and
dirty grain produced by impatient erasers would divulge about
the completed work even a fraction of what garbage may reveal
about our lives, there would be reason to believe in justice.
Regrettably, such eloquence is confined to that “casual
Elysium” of which Nabokov once spoke, and there “pencil
points do not snap.”6 Placed in a situation
decidedly less paradisical, the author must accept that his or
her labor only results in a “work” when the endeavors
no longer can be sighted and studied, seen and scrutinized. Even
an ode to the caoutchouc or a pean to the pencil sharpener —
and who has not once dreamt of preserving such dithyrambs on paper?
— are forced to disguise toil behind style, exertion behind
art. We argue that a work bearing the traces of labor has not
yet been “completed,” is still “unfinished”
— lacking that sole, redeeming “finish” and
last blessed “touch.” Why does the literary work demand
these sacrifices from its author, travails which sometimes are
noted, rarely praised, and never reciprocated? Why does it seem
to be only boredom, wavering hope, and resignation . . . in the
rare instance perhaps a sudden surge of courage, but usually ambivalence
and one or another form of idiocy . . . desperation . . . and
vanity, of course . . . that make us act as if the deal were closed,
as the saying goes, when the only thing we are likely to be able
to deal with is life seemingly without work?
Fatal. In order for the literary work to come into being, it must
forget the life of its author — even if the text consists
of nothing but personal reminiscences, private anecdotes, and
inner experiences . . . and even talks as “I” about
“me” without the slighest embarrassment or hesitation,
not batting a varicolored eyelid. We have learned to keep bios
apart from grafe, roughly in the manner in which we separate knives
from forks in a kitchen drawer, but are we able to distinguish
as clearly between process and product? Such categories do not
separate as easily as oil and water poured into the same vessel,
but have a tendency to mingle with the bewildering facility of
salt and sugar. We do not notice the difference until we place
a few grains in our mouth, testing them with our hesitant tongue
and grudging dentures — and how many readers are willing
to do that when what has been prepared for them rarely seems tasty?
It may be that the critical
commentary — whether evaluative or scientific, despondently
subjective or blandly matter-of-fact — once devoted itself
to studying discarded pieces of prose and dejected chips of thought
in the same way that coffee grinds are still being read. The idea
was that these obscure remains constituted the dregs of a work,
a sort of nutritious psychotope which, like any molecular sequence,
contained the promise of what the work would eventually become.7
At times, I wonder if our knowledge of literature really has distanced
us so very far from the positivistic model and genetic view of
history which here emerge and whose premises a French thinker
once tested when he discussed, with malicious elegance, the epistemic
worth of Nietzsche’s laundry receipts and memoranda. A work
does not emerge out of nothing, those connoisseurs remark, who
do not shun such extra-textual evidence; rather it is marked and
influenced, they maintain, by the threefold t of the originary
situation: time, tone, and temperament. (Add to this tendency,
and before long, these custodians of literature will have acquired
the fourth musketeer needed to defend the honor of the work.)
And of course, this may well be the case. Even Mallarmé’s
absolute book, the innermost wish of which must have been to free
itself from the silly fetters of contingency, carries traces of
its conditions as clearly as dice their eyes.
Still, I am willing to believe that it is part of the secret wish
of most authors to keep those of his or her readers, whose discriminating
eyes always go for the seams of a text, from discovering an underlying,
more original patchwork. To manufacture literature with paper,
pencil, and eraser, or keyboard, screen, and delete button, is
a thankless task. Not only does the material, so cumbersomely
gathered, sprawl in at least a dozen different directions —
somewhat like a game of pick-up-sticks, in fact, newly begun —
but in addition, its organization also demands what, in essence,
amounts to divine patience. (Thus it is hardly surprising that
literary works more often are interrupted than completed.) Despite
the cunning measures taken by the author to finish the work, exterior
conditions will be lodged within it like empty spaces in the game
of pick-up-sticks. But even if the work finally released by the
author still contains a joyless abundance of loose threads, of
diverging length and tenacity, differing texture and varying tinge,
once it has emancipated itself from the author’s clutches,
it must create the impression that it has been leaked like a big
solitary blot from the single shake of a pen.
Among many other matters, this implies that the literary work
must forget its origin without therefore becoming oblivious to
its provenance. Perhaps it would be possible to say that the work
must take leave of the hand that created it, even if it bears
its fingerprints as clearly as most skins their blush. (In some
sense, each oeuvre is also a désoeuvrement — each
play, if you wish, a dis-play.) This means that works of literature
have both beginnings and endings. Even those that subvert parergonal
conventions need these two polar opposites — if only, slyly
and stealthily, to ironize them. If a work claims to manage without
such categories, too, the institution or market will soon see
to it that they are re-attributed. The trajectory a literary work
describes in order to come into being is thus never infinite,
even if the author rarely can say when the first inklings were
registered or tell when it would be most prudent to take leave
of the work, as one does with a child, nurtured and sheltered,
but who now, it transpires, has had time to develop not only a
will of its own, but also tastes, habits, and — worst of
all — visions.
Phrased thus, the finite character
of the work is rather uninteresting. It becomes more enticing
to the mind, I believe, if instead of considering its beginning
and ending as bios and grafe, or for that matter as source and
offspring, we read the trajectory or that thinly pleated thread
that connects the two poles while illuminating them as the story
of a style — a sort of Bildungsgang of literary language
itself, where the beginning in no way needs to be hidden in the
very first word and where development, at any rate, is more reminiscent
of a multilayered onion than a regularly wound spool of thread.8
Here, the work approaches what we mean when we refer to the essay
as an “attempt.” We would then be dealing with a work
— in no manner confined to one title, two dustjackets, and
some hundred or so pages — the rows of letters and punctuation
markers which tell us a different story: the one about the search
among the words written for those yet to come.9
It may be considered one of
the few truly compelling characteristics of such a thread or trajectory
— perhaps it is the author’s sole straw — that
it reveals the work’s inner infinity. This interior expansion
no longer points to an evolution, I would like to suggest, at
least not of positivistic nature, but indicates rather an involution.
There is little development here, either of subject matter, stylistic
vices, or discursive virtues, but rather — in those happy
moments authors tend to attribute to grace, but for which they
merely have syllables and phrases to thank — an im-plication
of literature. This interior opening, pleated and manifold, is
that famous “world within the words,” of which speak
certain authors of flesh and blood, 10 and which
an invented poet such as John Shade termed an “involute
abode” in his poem “Pale Fire.”11
Only the possibility of such lingual life form may be raison enough
for the work’s être. Without further ado, I would
like to air the belief that this is no microcosmic version of
the universe, which is all-too-often assumed even by those who
ought to know better. Granted, the universe may be mirrored in
a puddle of water, but what kind of galaxy may be discerned by
those intense-looking savants who attempt to scrutinize a lonely
blot of ink?
To the curiosities of such inner infinity belongs the fact that
this expansion is not secured through the literary worth an author
may claim through his or her management of a certain thematic
capital. The ink stain to which I am referring may be as thin
as night-old ice, blossom like a flower, and shrivel like a liver,
at times it is taut and persevering as weed, at others ungainly
as running egg yolk, but in neither case does its effect upon
us depend on anything but the author’s sense of silence,
structure, and idiosyncrasy, rhythm, complication, and surprise
. . . and of course, the limitless belief in splendid insincerity.
The only (necessary but not sufficient) guarantee that a work
will open itself inward in this manner is the way in which syllables
are joined to each other, the distance between words tightened,
phrases tied up, and paragraphs subsequently locked into one another,
one after the other, until everything has become a suspended texture
of nuances which not even the lowest stab or meanest form of objection
may unravel — because now everything consists of a transparent
film of relations. But no, in order to remove at least that misunderstanding:
this is not an image of the “text,” that supposed
vindicator of the work which has been so celebrated in recent
years, but of the net that every work casts across life and fiction,
making these categories, viewed through the yarn of relationality,
blurry in aspect. “This / Was the real point,” Shade
emphasizes in his poem,” the contrapuntal theme”:
| |
Just this: not text, but texture;
not the dream
But topsy-turvical coincidence,
Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense.
Yes! It sufficed that I in life could find
Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind
Of correlated pattern in the game,
Plexed artistry, and something of the same
Pleasure in it as they who played it found.12
|
Only when the author weaves his or her correlated pattern with
the “plexed artistry” that will yield a literary work
may the reader’s thoughts tumble into that richly textured,
elastic nothingness the way we all shall one day. Pattern, not
pathos, is what keeps our attention. In short: the inner infinity
of a work does not depend on what the signs used may mean by chance,
but on the (sometimes chancy) manner in which they do so. Perhaps
this is the reason why the essay — as anti-genre par excellence,
and thus, at least on first appearance, least of all a “work”
— is privy to such strict formal requirements.
That the peculiar fall into
the transparent world within words is repeated anew every time
we read — and only thus does Shade’s “involute
abode” remain so wide and accomodating — belongs to
the work’s miracles. Such is the always-revisitable now
created by every sensibly correlated pattern. And hence to write
must be the same as to walk on water. In another book, entitled
Transparent Things, Nabokov puts it succinctly:
| |
A thin veneer of immediate reality
is spread over natural and artificial matter, and whoever
wishes to remain in the now, with the now, on the now, should
please not break its tension film. Otherwise the inexperienced
miracle-worker will find himself no longer walking on water
but descending upright among staring fish.13 |
What happens when you break that tension film is, I believe,
what takes place in The Gray Book. But instead of forming
that lonely blot of ink through which the reader may sink in satiated
calm — one which I have mentioned two or three times by
now, but yet have to admit has been borrowed from a text by William
Gass 14 - my particular blotch turned into
a cloud of pencil dust in which both dint and direction soon were
lost.
The idea had been to take
one of the more worn clichés of literary history —
that moment of death during which erratic memories from one’s
life, dressed up in visual drag, are supposed to put in their
last appearance — and extract from it some sort of vigor.
In a sense, this was my version of the “decisive thought”
of which Musil spoke. I wished to write an essay about the premises
of an essay. That which would make it formally “unique”
and “unalterable,” I thought, would be the attempt
to take an essay’s manner of signifying as the starting
point of my inquiry. Form, thus my creed, should be treated as
content. It goes without saying that this ambition offered some
problems, since meta-essays, too, tend to have to answer to demands
of formal nature. But out of the possible discrepancy between
saying and doing, that very gray region, I hoped that the suppositions
of essayism would emerge with greater clarity.
I found my first sample in
Rilke, in a passage at the beginning of his novel about Malte
Laurids Brigge. “How came that little gray woman”,
it is there stated,
| |
to stand once for a whole quarter
of an hour by my side in front of a shop window, showing me
an old, long pencil, that was thrust with infinite slowness
from her villainous, clenched hands? I pretended to look at
the articles displayed in the window and not to notice anything.
But she knew that I had seen her, she knew that I stood there
wondering what she was really doing. For I understood quite
well that the pencil in itself was of no consequence; I felt
that it was a sign, a sign for the initiated, a sign that
the outcasts know. I guessed she was indicating to me that
I should go somewhere or do something. And the strangest thing
about the whole affair was that I could not rid myself of
the feeling that there actually existed a certain compact
to which this sign belonged, and that this scene was in truth
something that I should have expected. 15 |
For me, the work on The Gray Book began there, in Rilke’s
tableau vivant, in which a gray little woman enigmatically pushes
a yellow (I guessed) pencil from her clenched fist. A signal,
that was all, but one “that the outcasts know,” which
yielded an uncertain zone between gesture and gist, movement and
meaning, under the sign . . . yes, that too . . . of destruction.
This was the signal of my gray spell.
I then proceeded to search
for elective affinities to the kind of precise vagueness which
Rilke’s pencil intimated. In an exact manner it appeared
to concern nothing in particular. My attention had been caught,
that is, by the way in which vagueness signifies. Thus, I began
to collect what Benjamin, in his essay on Kafka, once termed “cloudy
spots.” 16 From the vocabulary of librarians,
I borrowed the technical term “gray literature” —
I needed an organizing magnet for my erratic chips of mental metal
— in the hope that it would cover, or at least indicate,
the nebulous region with which I believed I had made my first
acquaintance. Conventionally, the term designates materials of
limited edition, distributed outside habitual channels: business
reports, specifications of technical nature, conference proceedings,
diplomatic dispatches, and the like — texts, that is, which
are instrumental in character and thus lack the kind of surplus
significance we usually ascribe to literature. In a handbook I
found, “gray literature,” however, was also characterized
as an “indicator of uncertainty, vagueness, and imprecision”17
— a description which to me identified very well what had
happened in the scene between Malte and the old woman in front
of a Parisian shop window. At any rate, this pointer or “indicator”
— this extended index, as it were — made it possible
for me to re-function the term and have it refer to the ungraspable
and vanishing character of a certain form of literature —
for disappearance, I knew, was the curious sun around which my
world revolved.
You may wonder what this account
has to do with more thoughtful considerations concerning what
I have termed essayism. Not much, I am afraid. In particular not
since destruction may well be some sort of Beatrice, at least
if we put faith in Mallarmé’s notorious letter to
his friend Léfebure,18
but disappearance will hardly guide a single author to paradise.
Yet permit me to return to Nabokov and a book in which he weaves
with great skill and daring an entire story around a vanishing
moment — hardly bigger than the point of a pencil, yet more
accomodating than the most voluminous bag. In the opening pages
of Invitation to a Beheading, he tells us of poor Cincinnatus
C., sentenced to death, who “dreamed that he walked on water”
and only has one chance to outlive himself:
| |
On the table glistened a clean
sheet of paper and, distinctly outlined against this whiteness,
lay a beautifully sharpened pencil, as long as the life of
any man except Cincinnatus, and with an ebony gleam to each
of its six facets. An enlightened descendant of the index
finger. Cincinnatus wrote: “In spite of everything I
am comparatively. After all I had premonitions, had premonitions
of this finale.” 19 |
In many respects, this is a remarkable passage, not least because
it appears at the beginning of the book but speaks of a conclusion.
Nabokov’s novel starts, that is, by ending. What occurs
in this oeuvre is a form of désoeuvrement. Cincinnatus’s
only chance for survival is to make use of the pencil resting
on the table in front of him. As long as he writes he cannot be
dead. A more “decisive thought” would be hard to imagine.
Here is not the occasion to engage in the manner in which Nabokov
enlarges this moment to encompass an entire life. Suffice it to
say that he does it in a way which ultimately makes it seem as
if the work’s interior contains its exterior — and
that, I believe, in the final analysis, is every author’s
dream. As readers, we peep into the book as into the cell in which
Cincinnatus sits, through a hole which is “like a leak in
a boat,” and it should come as no surprise that the hero
is forced to concede
| |
. . . and now I am losing some
thread, which I held so palpably only a moment ago. Where
is it? It has slipped out of my grasp! I am trembling over
the paper, chewing the pencil through the lead, hunching over
to conceal myself from the door through which a piercing eye
stings me in the nape. 20 |
The Gray Book attempted to mark that peephole, thanks
to which the external world leaks into the work’s interior,
by placing on its flyleaf the initial of Cincinnatus’s name,
albeit on its back, almost as if it had already given up the hope
of a continuation, and then wrote the succeeding point of abbreviation
in its open interior: .
Thus the medieval typographical sign for “those places where
a hard and obscure question cannot be opened up or solved,”21
the so-called cryphia, became the figure in whose sign the book
desired to be read. If this turned-around letter stood for the
work’s external aspect, an exterior that was now gradually
closing — thus completing — itself, then the dot in
its middle represented its internal aspect, that tiny, palpitating
heart which most immediately indicated the hovering, infinitesimal
center of Cincinnatus’s existence. 22
Inveterate authors. What complications.
Is this not vanity and caprice? Recall Shade’s appeal to
plexed artistry and then listen to Cincinnatus again:
| |
I am taking off layer after layer,
until at last . . . I do not know how to describe it, but
I know this: through the process of gradual divestment I reach
the final, indivisible, firm, radiant point, and this point
says: I am! like a pearl ring embedded in a shark’s
gory fat — O my eternal, my eternal . . . and this point
is enough for me — actually nothing more is necessary.
23 |
With some good will, I hoped it would be possible to read the
abstruse figure on the flyleaf of my book as the point of a pencil
seen frontally, and then, I imagined, it might offer an indication
of the sole salvation available to authors who try to stay both
afloat and alive. This yellow implement, out of which the involuted
story of one’s style emerges, might be the last and only
straw for a writer. To clutch it, however, is possible only if
he or she is also willing to concede that the writing that will
ensue must amount to a “process of gradual divestment.”
Such is the moral, if you will. Call it essayism — or the
vain yet infinite attempt to survive.
| |
“A straw?,” Kafka
remarks in one of his octavo books which I read later:
Many keep themselves above water with the stroke of a pencil.
Keep themselves? Like the drowner, dream of rescue. 24
|
Versions of this essay have been presented at the universities
in Berkeley, Stockholm, and Århus. A Danish translation,
made by John Bang Larsen, appeared as “Noget om et halmstrå,”
in Passage
28-29 (1998), 165-71.
| 1 |
Schibboleth: For Paul Celan, trans.
Joshua Wilner, in Word Traces: Readings of Paul Celan,
ed. Aris Fioretos (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1994), 48. |
| 2 |
Cf. Thomas Harrison, Essayism: Conrad, Musil, and Pirandello
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 3. For
the following two Musil quotations, see Essayism,
2 and 3-4. |
| 3 |
Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Gesammelte Werke,
ed. Adolf Frisé (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1978) 1:250.
The Man without Qualities, trans. Eithne Wilkins and
Ernst Kaiser (London: Secker & Warburg, 1953-1960), 1:297. |
| 4 |
Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, 1:253. The Man without
Qualities, 1:301. |
| 5 |
Den grå boken (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1994);
The Gray Book (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999). |
| 6 |
“The Vane Sisters,” in The Stories of Vladimir
Nabokov (New York: Knopf, 1995), 618. |
| 7 |
Nicholson Baker has parodied this compulsion in a short
piece entitled “Mlack,” reprinted in The Size
of Thoughts: Essays and Other Lumber (New York: Random
House, 1996), 117-18. One day, instead of erasing typos, poor
wordings, and volatile syntactic structures, he pushed them
to the bottom of his computer screen. Thus was created a backward
parody of the misdirected ambitions of a working day. |
| 8 |
This is, of course, a version of Nabokov’s quick-witted
observation that the “best part of a writer’s
biography is not the record of his adventures but the story
of his style” (Strong Opinions [New York: Vintage,
1990 (1973)], 155) — a thesis later radicalized by Joseph
Brodsky, when he claimed that the “writer’s biography
is in his twists of language.” See the title essay of
Less Than One: Selected Essays (New York: Farrar
Straus Giroux, 1986), 3. |
| 9 |
Cf. William Gass, “Preface,” In the Heart
of the Heart of the Country (Boston: Godine, 1989 [1968]),
xxv. |
| 10 |
For example — naturally — once again —
William Gass. Cf. The World Within the Word (New
York: Knopf, 1978). |
| 11 |
Vladimir Nabokov, Pale Fire (New York: Vintage,
1989 [1962]), 63, lines 817-18. |
| 12 |
Pale Fire, 62-63, lines 806-15. |
| 13 |
Transparent Things (New York: Vintage, 1989 [1972]),
2. |
| 14 |
See “Preface,” In the Heart of the Heart
of the Country, xxxiii. |
| 15 |
Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, Sämtliche
Werke, ed. Rilke-Archiv (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1976
[1955]), 11:712. |
| 16 |
“Franz Kafka. Zur zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages,”
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Hermann Schweppenhäuser
and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974-1989),
2;2:427. |
| 17 |
C. P. Auger, Information Sources in Grey Literature,
second ed. (London: Bowker-Saur, 1989), viii. |
| 18 |
See Correspondence, ed. Henri Mondor and Jean-Pierre
Richard (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), 1:246. |
| 19 |
Invitation to a Beheading (New York: Vintage, 1989
[1959]), 12-13. |
| 20 |
Invitation to a Beheading, 91. |
| 21 |
his locis ubi quaestio dura et obscura aperiri uel solui
non potuit. Isidore of Seville, Libri etymologiarum
(1386), 1:xxi. Quoted from M. B. Parkes, Pause and Effect:
Punctuation in the West (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993) , 173. |
| 22 |
And which Gunnar Ekelöf, in a memorable gesture, indicated
on his death bed. “At half past one at night,”
it is stated in En självbiografi, “after
uneasy sleep, when G. spoke much but inaudibly, he demands
water, changes to a pencil, opens his pyjama jacket, feels
with the one hand’s fingers along the ribs, then points
with the pencil at the heart, and says: ‘This here is
the heart.’ Speaks inaudibly, seems calm, matter of
fact.” Then Ingrid Ekelöf adds: “Falls asleep,
turns very pale suddenly, the breathing changes, and after
a short while he is dead. Apparently calm.” En självbiografi,
ed. Ingrid Ekelöf (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1971) , 300. |
| 23 |
Invitation to a Beheading, 90. |
| 24 |
“Fragmente aus Heften und losen Blättern,”
Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande, Gesammelte Werke,
ed. Max Brod (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1983), 6:280. |
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